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Abstract—We study a multi-period demand response problem
in the smart grid with multiple companies and their consumers.
We model the interactions by a Stackelberg game, where compa-
nies are the leaders and consumers are the followers. It is shown
that this game has a unique equilibrium at which the companies
set prices to maximize their revenues while the consumers re-
spond accordingly to maximize their utilities subject to their local
constraints. Billing minimization is achieved as an outcome of our
method. Closed-form expressions are provided for the strategies
of all players. Based on these solutions, a power allocation game
has been formulated, and which is shown to admit a unique pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium, for which closed-form expressions
are provided. For privacy, we provide a distributed algorithm
for the computation of all strategies. We study the asymptotic
behavior of equilibrium strategies when the numbers of periods
and consumers grow. We find an appropriate company-to-user
ratio for the large population regime. Furthermore, it is shown,
both analytically and numerically, that the multi-period scheme,
compared with the single-period one, provides more incentives
for energy consumers to participate in demand response. We have
also carried out case studies on real life data to demonstrate the
benefits of our approach, including billing savings of up to 30%.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid, a large-scale network of intelligent nodes
that can communicate, operate, and interact autonomously for
reliable and efficient power delivery, is envisioned to be a
secure and self-healing power network for the 21st century,
incorporating various sources of energy [1]. In the smart grid,
with the two-way communication infrastructure, consumers
are increasingly becoming more proactive. Demand-side man-
agement (DSM) is an essential part of this transition. Under
the umbrella of DSM, there are both technical and social
programs. The common aim of these programs is to help
improve energy efficiency in both the short term and the long
term. An overview of DSM in smart grids can be found in
[2]. An early tutorial on the demand-side view of electricity
markets can be found in [3].
One aspect of DSM is demand response, which is defined
as the response of consumers’ demands to price signals from
the utility companies [4]. Demand response allows com-
panies to manage the consumers’ demands, either directly
(through direct load control) or indirectly (through pricing
mechanisms). Demand response comes with great benefits. For
example, it has been shown that demand response programs
improve the electricity market efficiency [5]. Furthermore, the
Federal Utility Regulatory Commission estimates that demand
K. Alshehri and T. Bas¸ar are with the Coordinated Science
Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ({kalsheh2,
basar1}@illinois.edu). J. Liu is with Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering, Stony Brook University
(ji.liu@stonybrook.edu). X. Chen is with the Department of
Electrical, Computer, and Energy Engineering, University of Colorado
Boulder (xudong.chen@colorado.edu).
response programs will reduce the peak load by 4-9% in
the United States by 2019 [6]. A comprehensive survey on
the pricing methods and optimization algorithms for demand
response programs can be found in [7]. For an overview of
the methodologies and the challenges of load/price forecasting
and managing demand response in the smart grid, see [8].
With the internationalization of energy markets and the deep
penetration of renewable and distributed energy resources,
consumers are increasingly having more options in terms
of where to buy their energies, and some of them are be-
coming prosumers. This makes investigating load adaptive
pricing mechanisms in energy systems important. Using the
framework of game theory, load adaptive pricing has been
introduced decades ago [9]. In this paper, we utilize tools
from game theory to design a multi-period demand response
management program at which multiple companies (energy
sellers) and consumers (energy buyers) interact and reach an
equilibrium point at which prices and demands are optimally
chosen. While our mathematical analysis is general and appli-
cable to various smart grid setups, for the purpose of this paper,
one can think of “company” as a utility company serving
households, businesses, and industrial consumers.
While many energy consumers around the world have access
to only one company, alternative structures are now becoming
a reality [10]. For example, a company called LO3 Energy has
begun setting up a small-scale grid operated by consumers that
allows peer-to-peer transactions between distributed energy
resource owners and demanders in the neighborhood [11].
The emergence of such alternative structures motivate us
not to limit our contribution to the classical single-company-
multi-consumer scenario. Furthermore, in a smart grid where
consumers can simultaneously change their sources of energy,
competition between the owners of these energy sources arise,
leading to at least partially conflicting objectives between
various energy owners, which makes applying tools game
theory natural. With the use of game theory, advances in local
energy trading considering such possible conflicts are made
[12]. For a comprehensive survey of game-theoretic methods
for the smart grid, we refer to [13].
In the smart grid, temporal variations play a critical role
on both the supply side and the demand side. On the supply
side, it can be more costly to produce one unit of power in
a hot summer afternoon than later in the same day. Further-
more, temporal variations also affect the available power from
renewable sources. On the demand side, consumers typically
use more energy during the day than in the evening. Such
variations also make demand response programs important, as
they provide economic incentives to consumers to shift some
of their consumption. Accordingly, in this paper, we let our
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game-theoretic approach to also incorporate different time pe-
riods. Also, we investigate both analytically and numerically,
how the number of periods considered in the game affect the
outcomes at equilibrium.
In a nutshell, this paper introduces a game-theoretic ap-
proach for multi-period demand response management to
capture the interactions among multiple companies (energy
sellers who choose their prices to maximize their revenues,
in addition to allocating their power) and their consumers
(energy buyers who optimally respond to price signals, given
their minimum energy needs across the time horizon). We
derive all optimal (equilibrium) decisions in closed form, and
provide a distributed algorithm to guarantee the preservation
of privacy. Additionally, we use real demand response data to
demonstrate the applicability of our approach. Finally, we also
study the asymptotic behavior as the number of consumers and
the number of periods grows.
State of the Art. The use of game theory in the smart
grid has attracted significant attention in the literature [13]–
[38]. Application examples include: the control of small scale
power systems [14], management of energy exchange between
microgrids [15], and minimizing communicational delay be-
tween smart elements [16], and many others [13].
In this paper, we focus on DSM and demand response
applications [17]–[38]. These applications have demonstrated
that game theory can improve the reliability and efficiency
of the grid, while maintaining economic incentives. However,
to the best of our knowledge, the vast majority of these
contributions are either limited to a single seller case, or a
single period one. Furthermore, they primarily focus on either
the supply-side or the demand-side. Our goal here is to provide
insights on the multi-seller-multi-period case while capturing
the interactions between the supply and demand sides.
There are several papers in the literature that have addressed
inter-temporal considerations in DSM and demand response
[17]–[26]. An autonomous DSM through scheduling of appli-
ances has been implemented within a noncooperative game
framework in [17]. The participants in the game are energy
consumers who are connected to the same utility company, and
the outcome of the game is the power consumption schedule
of appliances that minimizes the overall energy cost. A more
recent extension adds energy storage into the picture [18],
where a Stackelberg game was developed between the utility
company and the end-consumers. Demand response schedul-
ing with multiclass appliances with different levels of elasticity
has been recently studied in [19]. In [20], [21], noncooperative
games to reduce peak-to-average ratio have been proposed.
The authors in [22] showed that it is also possible to reduce
peak-to-average ratio via a repeated game framework. A four-
stage Stackelberg game has been studied where three stages
are at the leader level (the utility retailer), and the fourth
stage is at the consumer level [23]. The retailer chooses the
amount of energy to procure, and the sources to produce it,
in addition to deciding on the price. Consumers respond to
these prices through demand selection. The authors in [24]
studied a user-centric differential game at which consumers
allocate their powers across their household devices. We note
that demand response can in fact be affected by wholesale
electricity markets. For example, in [25], day ahead dynamic
pricing for demand response has been introduced, where issues
related to wholesale price fluctuations faced by the retailer
are studied. Also, the authors in [26] have let a utility retailer
to act as intermediary player between end consumers (who
respond to price signals) and the wholesale market. While
the contributions in [17]–[26] are important and reveal the
importance of game theory for multi-period considerations
in demand-side management, they are all limited to a single
seller/utility/retailer case.
A considerable number of contributions have used game
theory to analyze cases where there are multiple sell-
ers/utilities/retailers [27]–[34]. For example, analysis of how
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles can sell back to the grid has
been explored in [27]–[29]. Similar analysis has also been
carried out for electric bicycles [30]. A two-level game (a
noncooperative game between multiple utility companies and
an evolutionary game for the consumers at the lower level)
has been proposed in [31]. The authors in [32] instroduce
a Stackelberg to capture the interactions between electricity
generator owners and a demand response aggregator. In [33],
a distributed game between energy consumers of different
types (sellers who have surplus of energy, and buyers who
have energy need) has been designed while emphasizing
individual preferences. Furthermore, in [34], the analysis of
three-party energy management scheme between residential
users, a shared facility controller, and the main power grid,
has been conducted via a Stackelberg game. These works
[27]–[34] have demonstrated the usefulness and the strength
of game theory in capturing the interplay between buyers and
sellers in the smart grid, but they are mainly focused on single
period setups.
Among the contributions in the literature the ones most
relevant to this paper are [35], [36]. A Stackelberg game for
demand response management with multiple utility companies
has been proposed in [35], where consumers choose their
optimal demands in response to prices announced by different
utility companies. This Stackelberg game was shown to have
a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which utility companies
maximize their revenues and end-consumers maximize their
payoff functions. In this framework, utility companies were the
leaders of the game and consumers were the followers. In [36],
an extension to the large population regime was carried out. In
this game, the utility companies aim to maximize their profits,
while the end-consumers wish to maximize their welfare. It
was shown in that paper that a unique number of utility
companies exists for which profits are maximized. A variation
of [35] to a user-centric approaches are discussed in [37],
[38]. These works [35]–[38], even though effectively capturing
consumer-utility interactions, are limited to the single-period
scenario.
Motivated by the limitations of existing works to single
periods/companies, this paper proposes an analytical multi-
period-multi-company game-theoretic framework for demand
response management in the smart grid. Such a generaliza-
tion enables us to analytically study the effects of market
competition between companies, along with the multi-period
considerations at both the demand-side and the supply-side
and the interactions between them.
Contributions. Our multi-period model and contributions
differ from those in the single-period works in [35], [36] at
the consumer-side, company-side, and the overall interaction.
At the consumer-side, we have an additional minimum en-
ergy constraint that needs to be satisfied across all periods,
and also achieve billing minimization. We also prove, bot
theoretically and numerically, that our generalization provides
desirable incentives (financial and in terms of satisfaction) for
consumers. At the company-side, we study an optimal power
allocation game over the time-horizon, and reveal desirable
properties that allow for the accommodation of company-
specific operational needs and profit-maximization. For the
overall interaction, we provide an alternative computationally
cheap closed-form solution for the prices, utilize real data to
demonstrate the fast convergence to optimal decisions while
preserving privacy, and study the asymptotic behavior as the
number of periods or consumers grows. Our analysis is general
and makes it possible to also accommodate various future
inter-temporal considerations.
We formulate in this paper a Stackelberg game for multi-
period-multi-company demand response management. We de-
rive solutions in closed form and find precise expressions
for maximizing demands at the consumers’ level, and the
revenue-maximizing prices for the companies. We also prove
the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium,
and propose a distributed algorithm to compute it using
only local information. Furthermore, we exploit the closed-
form expressions to formulate a new power allocation game,
we prove the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium of the power allocation game, and find
its analytical expression. In the large population regime, we
find an optimal company-to-consumer ratio. Furthermore, we
demonstrate the applicability of our game to real life data.
Our work captures the competition between companies, budget
limitations at the consumer-level, energy need for the entire
time-horizon.
Some of the material in this paper was presented earlier in
the conference paper [39], but this paper provides a more com-
prehensive treatment of the work. The major improvements
and novelties are as follows:
(1) Power Allocation: We formulate and solve a power al-
location game at the utility companies’ level. This game
addresses the following question: How can each utility
company optimally allocates its power availability over
the entire time horizon?
(2) Asymptotic Behavior: We study the asymptotic behavior
as the number of periods grows and prove that this
provides more incentives for consumer participation in
demand response. We also study the large population
regime and find the optimal company-to-consumer ratio.
(3) Privacy Preservation: In [39], the closed-form solutions
require each company to know the power availability of
other companies. We resolve this issue here by providing
a distributed algorithm that converges to optimal prices.
(4) Case Studies Using Real Data: In [39], simulations
showed how multi-period demand response provides in-
centives for consumers’ participation. In this work, we
show that this also holds using real life data. And we fur-
ther study the behavior of the prices, the effect of varying
the budgets, savings for consumers, and demonstrate the
fast convergence of our distributed algorithm.
(5) Proofs: Our conference paper only stated the results up
to Theorem 2, without proofs. This manuscript includes
a much more comprehensive treatment, containing all
proofs and derivations of the results.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Prelimenaries from game theory are provided in
Section II. The problem is formulated in Section III, and
optimal prices and demands are analyzed via a Stackelberg
game in Section IV. In Section V, a power allocation game at
the companies side is formulated based on the closed-form so-
lutions of the Stackelberg game. Next, we provide a distributed
algorithm for the computation of all optimal strategies using
local information in Section VI. The asymptotic behavior is
studied as the number of periods or the number of consumers
grows in Section VII. Next, we present results on case studies
using real demand response data in Section VIII. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section IX with a recap of main points
and identification of future directions. An appendix at the
end provides details of proofs of the five theorems and some
auxiliary results.
II. PRELIMINARIES FROM GAME THEORY
A static N -person noncooperative game is comprised play-
ers set, actions sets, and utility functions. Let the players set
be denoted by N := {1, . . . , N}, where N is the number of
players. Each player has an action set Ai, and the decision of
player i is denoted by ai ∈ Ai. The vector of decisions taken
by other players is a−i := (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aN ). Each
player i aims to maximize his/her utility function ui(ai,a−i).
An equilibrium concept that is suitable for such games is the
Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is defined below.
Definition 1: The action vector a∗ ∈ A1 × · · · × AN
constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the N -person static non-
cooperative game in pure-strategies if
ui(a
∗
i ,a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(ai,a∗−i) ∀ai ∈ Ai, i ∈ N . (1)
Sometimes it would be beneficial to allow for hierarchy in
the decision process. In such a case, there are two types
of players, leaders and followers. The leaders’ decisions are
more dominant, and the followers respond to the decisions
taken by the leaders. This kind of hierarchal games is called
Stackelberg games, and the corresponding solution concept
is called the Stackelberg equilibrium. The leaders have the
privilege of choosing how to take their actions at the begin-
ning of the game. However, they have to take into account
how the followers would respond to these actions and how
each leader’s decision is influenced by the decisions of the
other leaders. To be more precise, suppose that we have
K leaders and N followers. Denote the followers set by
N := {1, . . . , N}, and the leaders set by K := {1, . . . ,K},
with action sets (Fi)i∈N and (Lj)j∈K, respectively. Denote
the action of leader j by aj ∈ Lj , and the action of follower
i by bi ∈ Fi. The vector of actions taken by all leaders
Price-Selection Nash Game
k=1 k=2 k=3
Stackelberg
Game
prices demands𝑑",$(𝑡)𝑝$(𝑡)
n=5n=4
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Fig. 1: The interaction between companies and their
consumers. Companies play a price-selection Nash game.
Then, consumers respond by choosing their demands (the
entire two-level interaction is a Stackelberg game).
is a := (a1, . . . , aK). The utility of leader j is denoted by
uj(aj ,a−j,b(a)), where a−j denotes the decisions of the
other leaders, and b(a) = (b1(a), . . . , bN (a)) ∈ F1×· · ·×FN .
Definition 2: The action vector a∗ ∈ L1 × · · · × LK is
a Stackelberg Equilibrium strategy for all the K leaders in
pure-strategies if, for each j ∈ K,
uj(a
∗
j ,a
∗
−j,b
∗(a∗)) ≥ uj(aj ,a∗−j,b∗(aj;a∗−j)) ∀aj ∈ Lj (2)
where b∗(a) ∈ F is the optimal response by all followers to
the leaders’ decisions (under the adopted equilibrium solution
concept at the followers level). For a Stackelberg game, the
pair (a∗,b∗(a∗)) constitutes the equilibrium strategy.
III. FORMULATION OF A MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Let K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} be the set of companies, N =
{1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of consumers, and T = {1, 2, . . . , T}
be the finite set of time slots.
We formulate a static Stackelberg game between utility
companies (the leaders) and their consumers (the followers)
to find revenue maximizing prices and optimal demands. In
Stackelberg games, the leader(s) first announce their decisions
to the follower(s), and then the followers respond. In our game,
the leaders send price signals to the consumers, who respond
optimally by choosing their demands. To capture the market
competition between the utility companies, we let them play
a price-selection Nash game. The equilibrium point of the
price-selection game is what utility companies announce to
their consumers. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchical interaction
between companies and consumers.
In the parlance of dynamic game theory [40], we are
dealing here with open-loop information structures, with the
corresponding equilibrium at the utilities level being open-
loop Nash equilibrium. Therefore, this is a one-shot game at
which all the prices for all the periods are announced at the
beginning of the game, and the followers respond to these
prices by solving their local optimization problems.
Consumer-Side. Because of energy scheduling and storage,
consumers may have some flexibility on when to receive a
certain amount of energy. We are concerned about the total
amount of shiftable energy. For non-shiftable energy, one can
add some period-specific constraints. Each energy consumer
n ∈ N receives all price signals from each company k ∈ K
at each time slot t ∈ T and aims to select his corresponding
utility-maximizing demand dn,k(t) ≥ 0 for each time slot from
each company, subject to budget and energy need constraints.
Denote company k’s price at time t by pk(t). Let Bn ≥ 0
and Eminn ≥ 0 denote, respectively, consumer n’s budget and
minimum energy need for the entire time-horizon. The utility
of consumer n is defined as
Uconsumer,n = γn
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
ln(ζn + dn,k(t)) (3)
where γn > 0 and ζn ≥ 1 are preference parameters. Note
that if 0 ≤ ζn < 1 or γn < 0, the utility of the consumer
becomes negative, which is not realistic for demand response
applications, and hence we take γn > 0 and ζn ≥ 1. A
typical value for ζn is 1, but we still solve the problem for
any ζn ≥ 1 to keep it general. The logarithmic function (3) is
known to provide proportional fairness and is widely used to
model consumer behavior in economics [30], [41]. It has been
validated to provide good demand response [30], [35], [37],
[42]–[45]. Our analysis in this paper is quite general and can
be used in any market arrangement with multiple sellers and
buyers under budget limitations and capacity constraints.
Consumer n aims to achieve the highest payoff while
meeting the threshold of minimum amount of energy and not
exceeding a certain budget. To be more precise, given Bn ≥ 0,
Eminn ≥ 0, and pk(t) > 0, the consumer-side optimization
problem is formulated as follows:
maximize
dn,k
Uconsumer,n
subject to
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)dn,k(t) ≤ Bn (4)∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
dn,k(t) ≥ Eminn (5)
dn,k(t) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, ∀t ∈ T (6)
Note that there is no game played among the consumers.
Each consumer responds to the price signals using only
her local information. We indirectly handle consumers’ cost
minimization via our analysis in later sections.
Company-Side. Letting p−k denote the prices set by other
companies, the total revenue for company k is given by
Ucompany,k =
∑
t∈T
pk(t)
∑
n∈N
dn,k(pk,p−k, t). (7)
Given the power availability of company k at period t, denoted
by Gk(t), and for a fixed p−k, company k’s problem is;
maximize
pk
Ucompany,k(pk,p−k)
subject to
∑
n∈N
dn,k(pk,p−k, t) ≤ Gk(t), ∀ t ∈ T (8)
pk(t) > 0, ∀ t ∈ T (9)
The goal of each company is to maximize its revenue and
hence maximize its profit. Additionally, because of the market
competition, the prices announced by other companies also
affect the determination of the price at company k. Thus,
company k’s price selection is actually a response to what
other competitors in the market have announced; this response
is also constrained by the availability of power. Thus, what we
have is a Nash game among the companies. We emphasize that
while company k’s problem is affected by what its competitors
decide, we can still achieve the equilibrium strategies using
only local information, via our distributed algorithm discussed
later in Section VI. Finally, while at this point we have Gk(t)’s
fixed, we will later formulate a power allocation game to
optimally choose them.
IV. DEMAND SELECTION AND REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
(STACKELBERG GAME)
In this section, we solve the above optimization problems
in closed form and demonstrate the solutions are unique.
Consumer-Side Analysis. We start by relaxing the min-
imum energy constraint (5). For each consumer n ∈ N , the
associated Lagrange function is given as follows:
Lconsumer,n = γn
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
ln(ζn + dn,k(t))
−λn,1
(∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)dn,k(t)−Bn
)
+
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
λn,2(k, t)dn,k(t)
where λn,i’s are the Lagrange multipliers. The KKT conditions
of optimality in this case are sufficient because the objective
function is strictly concave and the constraints are linear [46],
and solving for them leads to
d∗n,k(t) =
Bn +
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T pk(t)ζn
KTpk(t)
−ζn, ∀ t ∈ T , k ∈ K,
(10)
which is a generalization of the single-period case in [35]. A
detailed derivation of (10) can be found in [39].
The following theorem, whose proof can be found in the
Appendix, states the necessary and sufficient condition for
Bn so that the above d∗n,k(t)’s meet the minimum energy
constraint (5).
Theorem 1: For each consumer n ∈ N , the demand d∗n,k(t)
given by (10) satisfies (5) if, and only if,
Bn ≥ E
min
n + ζnKT∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
1
KTpk(t)
− ζn
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t). (11)
Remark 1: The above theorem can be interpreted as billing
costs minimization. The equality in (11) corresponds to the
case at which consumer n minimizes his billing cost subject
to the energy need constraint, and it can be also computed
locally. We later demonstrate that using (11) leads to savings
that can exceed 10%− 30%. 
Company-Side Analysis We apply the demands derived
in the consumers-side analysis (which were functions of the
prices) and show that optimality is achieved at the equality
of constraint (8). We start by solving for prices that satisfy
the equality at (8) and then prove that they are revenue-
maximizing, strictly positive, and unique. Consider the equal-
ity in (8), and by the optimal demands (10), there holds∑
n∈N Bn +
∑
n∈N ζn
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T pk(t)
KTpk(t)
=
∑
n∈N
ζn+Gk(t),
for all t ∈ T . Let Z =∑n∈N ζn and B =∑n∈N Bn. Then,
for each company k ∈ K,
B+Z
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t) = KTpk(t)(Gk(t)+Z), ∀ t ∈ T . (12)
The equations in (12) can be combined into a linear equation
AP = Y , where A is a KT × KT matrix whose diagonal
entries are KT (Gk(t) + Z) − Z, k ∈ K, t ∈ T , and off-
diagonal entries all equal to−Z, P is a vector in RKT stacking
pk(t), k ∈ K, t ∈ T , and Y a vector in RKT whose entries
all equal to B.
We have the following results (proofs are in the Appendix).
Lemma 1: The matrix A is invertible.
Lemma 2: The prices that solve (12) are strictly positive
and uniquely given by
p∗k(t) =
B
Gk(t) + Z
(
1
KT −∑j∈K∑t∈T ZGj(t)+Z
)
. (13)
In practice, due to production costs and market regulations,
p∗k(t) cannot be outside the range of some lower and upper
bounds [pmink (t), p
max
k (t)] for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K, as in
[35]. If p∗k(t) < p
min
k (t), then p
∗
k(t) is set to p
min
k (t), and
similarly for the upper-bound, if p∗k(t) > p
max
k (t), then we set
p∗k(t) = p
max
k (t).
Remark 2: Letting ζn = 1 for each consumer, the value of
Z coincides with N . In this case, by (13), we observe that for
any given Gk(t)’s,
p∗k(t)(Gk(t) +N)
is a constant for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K. Thus, the power
availability is inversely proportional to the prices. 
Remark 3: Lemma 2 provides a computationally cheap
expression for the prices. Since p∗k(t) can be directly computed
using (13), there is no need to numerically compute A−1 or
|A|. This enables us to deal with a large number of periods
or utility companies, without worrying about computational
complexity. 
Existence and Uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilib-
rium. Denote the strategy space of utility company k (a leader
in the game) at t by Lk,t := [pmink (t), pmaxk (t)]. The strategy
space of k for the entire time horizon is Lk = Lk,1×· · ·×Lk,T .
and the strategy space of all companies is L = L1×· · ·×LK .
For given price selections (p1, . . . , pK) ∈ L1 × · · · × LK ,
the optimal response from all consumers is
d∗(p) = {d∗1(p), d∗2(p), . . . , d∗N (p)}
where for each n ∈ N , d∗n(p) is the unique maximizer for
Uconsumer,n(dn,p) and is given by (10). This now leads to the
following theorem, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2:
(i) There exists a unique (open-loop) Nash equilibrium for the
price-selection game and it is given by (13).
(ii) There exists a unique (open-loop) Stackelberg equilibrium
and it is given by the pair d∗(p) and (13).
At the Stackelberg equilibrium, it can be easily verified that∑
k∈K
Ucompany,k(p
∗
k,p
∗
−k) =
∑
n∈N
Bn. (14)
One observation is that when a company gains in terms of
revenue, the same amount must be lost by other companies
because the sum of revenues is a constant, which demonstrates
a conflict of objectives between utility companies. However, by
the definition of the equilibrium strategy, this is the best each
company can do, for fixed power availabilities Gk(t)’s. But,
given a total amount of available power, Gtotalk , a company has
across the time horizon, it is possible that it gains in terms of
revenue by an efficient power allocation. This motivates us to
formulate a power allocation game and analytically answer the
following question: How can company k allocate its power so
that it maximizes its revenue?
V. POWER ALLOCATION (NASH GAME)
In this section, we exploit the closed-form solutions for
consumer demands and companies’ prices to formulate and
solve a power allocation game for companies. For the remain-
ing part of this paper, and for the purpose of simplifying the
analysis without losing the main insights, we assume that for
each consumer n, we have γn = ζn = 1 =⇒ Z = N .
Given the power availability from other companies, G−k,
and since the equality in (8) is satisfied at equilibrium, the
revenue function of company k can be represented as
Uk := Uk(Gk,G−k) =
∑
t∈T
p∗k(t)Gk(t). (15)
The optimal prices (13) are functions of Gk(t)’s, leading to
Uk = B
∑
t∈T
Gk(t)
(Gk(t) +N)(KT −
∑
j∈K
∑
t∈T
N
Gj(t)+N
)
(16)
where B =
∑
n∈N Bn.
Denote the action set of company k at time t by Pk,t. Since
Gk(t)’s are non-negative, we have Pk,t = [0, Gtotalk ], for any
t ∈ T and any k ∈ K. Thus, given G−k, the optimization
problem for company k is as follows:
maximize
Gk∈Pk=Pk,1×···×Pk,T
Uk(Gk,G−k)
subject to
∑
t∈T
Gk(t) ≤ Gtotalk (17)
The above problem is only applicable for the case at
which generation is fully controllable, for example, it can be
from dispatchable generators. For the smart grid, because of
the various generation sources, full-controllability does not
always hold, and in fact, for renewable resources it could
be completely gone. We demonstrate the ability to relax this
assumption later.
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. The
following theorem, whose proof can be found in the Appendix,
states the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, and
provides an expression for it.
Theorem 3: There exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium for the power allocation game, and it is given by
G∗k(t) = G
total
k /T , ∀ t ∈ T , k ∈ K. (18)
Remark 4: The proof of Theorem 3 reveals that (16)
is strictly concave and increasing in each Gk(t). This is
an important property that allows accommodating further
company-specific operational constraints and relaxing the full-
controllability assumption. To illustrate, suppose that company
k has a mix of generation sources for which generation is
controllable for some periods and only partially controllable
for others. Then, it can add period-specific bounds. Existence
and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium are still
guaranteed due to the strict concavity [40]. Since generation
costs are typically assumed to be convex, company k can also
allocate its generation to maximize its profit, by subtracting
the cost from (16), and if the cost is strictly convex, again
there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
VI. PRIVACY-PRESERVATION (DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM)
The NE for the power allocation game given by (18)
can easily be computed by each company k using its local
information. Moreover, for energy users, it can be seen from
(10) that in the computation of user n’s optimal demand
selection, no information from other users is needed, and
user n’s local information would suffice for optimal response.
However, the closed-form solution for optimal prices p∗k(t)’s
given by (13) requires each company to know consumers’
budgets and the power availability of all the other companies.
Companies might not want to share such information with
each other. To avoid such a privacy concern, we propose a
distributed algorithm that allows companies to compute their
optimal prices using only local information, and show that this
algorithm converges to the optimal prices given by (13). This
algorithm, combined with utility-maximizing demands given
by (10) and the NE given by (18), leads to the computation of
all the optimal strategies with only local information at both
the company level and the consumer level.
Algorithm 1 Distributed algorithm for computing the prices
with local information
1: Arbitrarily choose p(0)k (t), ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
2: Repeat for i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
3: For each user n ∈ N , compute d(i)n,k(t) from k ∈ K at
t ∈ T by (10), then update utility companies with demand
signals
4: For each un-updated price p(i+1)k (t) announced by k ∈ K
at t ∈ T , use (19)
5: If p(i+1)k (t) 6= p(i)k (t), update users and go to 3
6: Else, send a no-change signal to users and go to 4
7: If p(i+1)k (t) = p
(i)
k (t) ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K, stop
8: Else, go to 2
For each iteration i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, denote the demand
from user n at time t from company k by d(i)n,k(t), and the
price announced by company k and time t by p(i)k (t). In
our algorithm, p(0)k (t) is chosen arbitrarily for each company
k ∈ K and time t ∈ T . Based on the initial price selection,
d
(0)
n,k is computed using (10). Then, the prices are sequentially
updated using the following update rule:
p
(i+1)
k (t) = p
(i)
k (t) +
∑
n∈N d
(i)
n,k(t)−Gk(t)

(i)
k,t
, (19)
where (i)k,t > 0 is appropriately selected for company k at time
t in iteration i, and we find an expression for it as a function of
p
(i)
k (t) in Theorem 4. Whenever a company k updates its price
at time t, it transmits the price to each consumer n ∈ N , and
they modify their demands accordingly. Once prices converge
to their optimal values, users optimally respond by (10) and
the algorithm terminates. We have the following theorem for
the convergence of the algorithm; its proof can be found in
the Appendix.
Theorem 4: For each company k ∈ K at time t ∈ T
in iteration i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, if the prices are sequentially
updated using (19) such that

(i)
k,t =
Gk(t) +N
p
(i)
k (t)
+ δ,
where δ ≥ 0, then Algorithm 1 converges to optimal prices.
VII. ASYMPTOTIC REGIMES
In this section, we study the asymptotic behavior of the
equilibrium strategies for the demands, prices, and power allo-
cation, given by (13), (10), and (18), respectively. Particularly,
we study how the payoffs, revenues, prices, and demands are
affected as T,N → ∞. Moreover, we find an appropriate
company-to-user ratio for the large population regime.
When the Number of Periods Grows. Suppose all com-
panies have the same total power availability Gtotalk . In this
case, we have
p∗k(t) =
∑
m∈N Bm
KTG∗k(t)
=
∑
m∈N Bm
KGtotalk
. (20)
Furthermore,
d∗n,k(t) =
Bn +KTp
∗
k(t)
KTp∗k(t)
− 1 = G
total
k Bn
T
∑
m∈N Bm
, (21)
and the payoff of user n becomes
Uuser,n = KT ln
(
1 +
Gtotalk Bn/
∑
m∈N Bm
T
)
(22)
in which Gtotalk Bn/
∑
m∈N Bm is positive. Thus, as T
increases, the multiplicative term KT of the logarithmic
function increases at a faster rate than the decrease of
ln
(
BnG
total
k /B/T + 1
)
. Hence, as T increases, the equilib-
rium utility of each user n ∈ N monotonically increases.
Taking the limit, it can be verified that
lim
T→∞
Uuser,n(T ) =
K
∑
t∈T G
∗
k(t)Bn∑
m∈N Bm
. (23)
Furthermore, note that the demand d∗n,k(t) from user n ∈ N
from company k ∈ K at time t ∈ T converges to zero as
T → ∞. We claim that the revenues are constants. To see
this, recall that
Ugen,k(p
∗
k,p
∗
−k) = Tp
∗
k(t)
∑
t∈T
d∗n,k(t)
= p∗k(t)G
total
k =
∑
n∈N Bn
K
,
which is a constant since both the number of companies and
the budgets of the users are fixed.
Remark 5: At the equilibrium, the monotonicity of the
payoffs of the users shows that increasing the number of
periods and partitioning the total power among them lead
to more incentives for consumers’ participation. However, it
might not be very beneficial to increase the number of periods
to a very high value. First, the rate of increase in terms of
users’ utilities gets smaller and smaller. Second, having a high
number of periods leads to smaller demands for each period
and that might violate the minimum energy need at the users’
level. So, it is beneficial to increase the number of periods up
to a certain point (compared to having T = 1), but it might
not be beneficial to let T become arbitrarily large. 
Remark 6: Note that the limit point of the utility function of
user n is the proportion of his budget to the total budgets times
the total power availability. So if a particular user has 1% of
the sum of all the budgets, he gets 1% of the available power.
Furthermore, the revenue for each company is the proportion
of the sum of the budgets to the number of companies. In
addition, the demand by user n from company k at time t is
the proportion of his budget to the total budgets times the total
power availability at t from k. 
When the Number of Consumers Grows. When the
number of consumers increases, each additional user has
some budget Bn, and since the total power availability is
fixed, competition among users arises on the same amount of
power and hence utility companies will increase their revenue-
maximizing prices.
We start by assuming that the budget for each user n ∈ N
is the same, and then increase the number of users N and
see what happens as N → ∞. We also keep the assumption
that Gtotalk (t) is the same for all companies. In this case, the
optimal prices and demands become
p∗k(t) =
NBn
KTG∗k(t)
(24)
d∗n,k(t) =
Gtotalk
TN
(25)
Clearly, p∗k(t)→∞ as N →∞ and d∗n,k(t)→ 0 as N →∞.
When the population is large and the power availability is
fixed, it is not surprising that d∗n,k(t)→ 0 because the portion
each user can get from the available power gets smaller and
smaller as N increases. Furthermore, it can be easily verified
that limN→∞ Ugen,k(N) =∞ and limN→∞ Uuser,n(N) = 0.
Thus, with the limit points resulting in unrealistic outcomes, a
balance between the supply and demand needs to be achieved,
which we achieve by finding an appropriate company-to-user
ratio.
Now, the question we ask is: for a given maximum allowable
price pmaxk (t), call it p
max, what is the appropriate company-
to-user ratio KN ? If there are more companies than necessary
in the market, there will be losses in terms of revenues. On the
other hand, if there are fewer companies than necessary, the
prices can exceed pmax, leading to undesirable outcomes. The
following theorem, whose proof can be found in the Appendix,
provides an optimal ratio at which prices do not exceed
pmax and the revenues being maximized while satisfying the
equality in (14).
Theorem 5: Suppose that the total power availabilities Gtotalk
for all companies are the same. Then, at the NE of the power
allocation game, and at the Stackelberg equilibrium of the
price and demand selection game, the optimal prices p∗k(t)’s
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Fig. 2: Total power offered by company (left), Stackelberg game and EcoGrid EU experimental prices (middle), and the
cumulative payments and billing savings for all consumers (right).
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the power allocation game) and heterogeneous consumers (with different budgets) using the EcoGrid EU experimental data.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Iteration i
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
ice
(D
K
K
/k
W
h)
δ = 1000 (fast convergence)
k = 1
k = 2
k = 3
k = 4
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Iteration i
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
Pr
ice
(D
K
K
/M
W
h)
δ = 10000 (slower convergence)
k = 1
k = 2
k = 3
k = 4
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Iteration i
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
Pr
ice
(D
K
K
/M
W
h)
×101 δ = −10000 (divergence)
k = 1
k = 2
k = 3
k = 4
Fig. 4: Distributed algorithm’s performance (Theorem 4 requires δ ≥ 0) using the EcoGrid EU experimental data.
given by (13) satisfy
p∗k(t) ≤ pmax,∑
k∈K
Uk(p
∗
k,p
∗
−k) =
∑
n∈N
Bn,
if, and only if,
K
N
≥ Bn
pmaxTG∗k(t)
.
VIII. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we present results on some case studies on
representative days from a Dutch smart grid pilot [47] and
the EcoGrid EU project [48]. We numerically study optimal
prices and demands, and their corresponding payments and
utility functions. We also show how our approach results in
monetary savings for consumers. Furthermore, we show that
increasing the number of periods provides more incentives
for consumers’ participation in demand response management.
Additionally, we demonstrate the fast convergence of our
distributed algorithm to optimal prices. We also release an
open-source interactive tool containing the simulations using
Python and Jupyter notebooks [49] in [50].
EcoGrid EU Project. This demand response project was
conducted from March 2011 to August 2015 in Bornholm,
Denmark. The number of consumers in this experiment was
approximately 2000. For a representative day (December 5th,
2014), we apply our method to hourly prices and shiftable
demand consumption from this experiment1. The experi-
mental prices are in DKK/MWh and we scale them to
DKK/kWh. We start by assuming that there is only one
company (K = 1) and letting the consumers to be homo-
geneous (they have the same budgets and energy need) with
N = 2000, and then generalize the results to K > 1 and
heterogeneous consumers. Since we are taking hourly prices
for a day, we have T = 24.
Finding the necessary parameters: In our model, for each
period t, we have a fixed power availability G1(t) on the
supply-side. Also, for each consumer n, his minimum demand
1Due to the unavailability of data in raw format, in this section, we take
estimates of the data points from publicly available figures.
Eminn and budget Bn are fixed for the entire horizon. These
are necessary parameters that need to be known to solve for
optimal demands and prices. We let the power availabilities
G1(t)’s match the experimental hourly variation of the total
load (this is consistent with our model, as we primarily focus
on shiftable consumption). For the entire time-horizon, we
have
∑2000
n=1 E
min
n =
∑24
t=1G1(t) ≈ 54MW. Since consumers
are homogenous, we have Eminn =
∑24
t=1G1(t)
2000 ≈ 27kW.
Next, using Theorem 1, we plug-in Eminn and the experimental
hourly prices in (11) to find the minimum budget need, which
is Bn ≈ 7.6DKK.
Numerical Results: Now, using the parameters found above,
we can compute the optimal demands and prices for the
Stackelberg game using (10) and (13), and study their effects.
In Figure 2, we plot the total power availabilities G1(t)’s,
the prices found experimentally and using the Stackelberg
game, and the corresponding total payments by all consumers
for their demands. Our approach leads to prices that have a
slightly smaller mean as in the experiment and a significantly
smaller variance. One advantage our approach has is that it
results in billing savings for consumers, as we show in Figure
2 (this demonstrates the importance of Theorem 1, which we
use to find the minimum budget need for the consumers). Note
that the net demands for each time period are the same for the
Stackelberg game as for the experimental ones (so, consumers
receive the same amount of energy for smaller costs). This
would lead to more monetary incentives for active consumer
participation in demand response management, while being
consistent with the company’s objectives, since the Stackelberg
game prices found using (13) are revenue-maximizing as
shown in the proof of Theorem 2.
Next, we make consumers heterogeneous and increase the
number of companies. We differentiate between consumers by
varying their budgets, and take 5 classes of consumers, as
in the EcoGrid EU experiment. We let consumers’ budgets
be B1−400 = 4DKK, B401−800 = 5DKK, B801−1200 =
6DKK, B1201−1600 = 7DKK, and B1601−2000 = 8DKK.
We also let the number of companies be K = 4, which
is consistent with the actual energy sources used in the
experiment. Precisely, the system is powered by 61% wind
energy (k = 1), 27% biomass (k = 2), 9% solar energy
(k = 3), and 3% biogas (k = 4). We split the total power
(54MW ) among the energy sources according to experimental
proportions, assuming that each energy source is owned by a
single company that acts as a company in our game.
With the above setup, we study the effect of varying the
number of periods T from 1 to 50. To do this, we need to
find a way for companies to allocate their total power across
the time horizon for each fixed T , which can be done by
using Theorem 3, which states that equally splitting the total
power across the time horizon for each company k constitutes
a unique Nash equilibrium for the power allocation game (it
is also shown to be the global maximizer in the proof).
Figure 3 shows the influence of varying the number of
periods on prices, power allocated, revenues, and consumer
utilities. We observe that as T increases, the power allocated
at each period gets smaller and smaller. On the other hand,
prices can increase or decrease, dependent on the company,
and they converge to positive constants. Furthermore, revenues
might also increase or decrease, dependent on the company
(note that the company that achieves the highest revenue is
the one that offers the lowest prices, and vice-versa). In view
of (14), the sum of revenues at equilibrium is a constant
that matches the sum of all consumer budgets. And hence,
whenever the revenue increases (decreases) for a company
k, at least one other company will incur a loss (gain) in
terms of revenue. None of the companies can do better by
altering its power availabilities across the time horizon, nor
by changing its prices. This follows from the definition of
Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we note that the revenues are
proportional with the total capacity, and the company with
highest (lowest) portion of the market is the one that incurs
the largest increase (decrease) in revenue. Changes seem to
saturate beyond T = 24.
Interestingly, in Figure 3 we observe that as T increases,
the utilities for consumers also increase, and hence they will
be more attracted to demand response programs, which is
desirable [51]. In comparison with the single-period setup
[35], [36], this shows that the multi-period demand response
provides improvements on the consumers’ end. This increase,
however, does not change significantly after a certain number
of periods, and we note that the choice of T = 24 seems to be
appropriate and meaningful as it can represent hourly pricing
for a day.
To demonstrate the performance of our algorithm, we take
the case when T = 1 and study the algorithm’s performance
for different values of δ in Figure 4. When δ = 1000, we
observe that the algorithm converges very fast to the optimal
prices and takes about less than 3 iterations to reach equi-
librium. The values are consistent with the values in Figure
3 when T = 1, where we used the analytical expressions of
the prices. Next, we increase δ to 10000 and observe that
the algorithm converges at a lower rate, but still very fast.
Thus, the rate of convergence is inversely proportional to the
value of δ. However, when δ decreases to a negative value,
there are no guarantees on convergence. For example, if we
take δ = −10000, the algorithm diverges. Theorem 4 only
guarantees the convergence of the algorithm when δ ≥ 0. We
have verified that our distributed algorithm converges very fast
for various values of δ and alternative values of T and K,
and the reader might experiment with varying them using our
open-source code in [50].
Dutch Smart Grid Pilot. This experiment was conducted
in Zwolle, the Netherlands, for about one year (May, 2014 to
May, 2015). Dynamic tariffs and smart appliances were used
to study the responsiveness of residential electricity demand.
Tariffs were announced to consumers a day ahead. For a
group of 77 consumers with modal incomes, we study the
behavior of the average consumer’s demand and payments
using experimental prices and the prices derived using our
method. Here, we take K = 1, which is consistent with the
Dutch pilot. Also, the experimental prices are in EUR/kWh.
Furthermore, we take the consumers to be homogenous.
Finding the necessary parameters: We find the parameters
as in the EcoGrid EU experiment with some slight modifi-
cations. We approximate the net experimental demands by
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Fig. 5: Average consumer demand (left), Stackelberg game and Dutch pilot prices (middle), and the cumulative payments and
billing savings for average consumer (right).
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Iteration i
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Pr
ice
(E
U
R
/k
W
h)
δ = 100 (fast convergence)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Iteration i
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
ice
(E
U
R
/k
W
h)
δ = 1000 (slower convergence)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Iteration i
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Pr
ice
(E
U
R
/k
W
h)
δ = −1000 (divergence)
Fig. 6: Distributed algorithm’s performance (Theorem 4 requires δ ≥ 0) using the Dutch pilot data.
consumers for each period t, and assume that G1(t) on the
supply-side matches our approximation. For each consumer n,
we let Eminn be equal to the average consumer’s net demand
for the entire day (here, Eminn ≈ 8.8kW ). Then, we plug-in
Eminn and the experimental hourly prices in (11) to find the
minimum necessary daily budget, which is Bn ≈ 1.1EUR.
Numerical Results: Using the above parameters, we again
use (10) and (13) to find optimal demands and prices. In Figure
5, we plot the average consumer’s hourly demand, the prices
found experimentally and using the Stackelberg game, and the
corresponding total payments by the average consumer. We
again observe that our approach leads to smaller prices with
a significantly smaller variance. For the average consumer,
we observe that significant savings can be achieved using our
approach (more than 30%). Next, we study the performance
of our distributed algorithm in Figure 6. As in the case of the
EcoGrid EU experimental data, our algorithm achieves fast
convergence to optimal prices using only local information.
IX. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this paper, a privacy-preserving multi-period demand
response problem has been studied. We have captured the
interactions between companies and energy consumers, and
found optimal prices and demands. Based on the closed-form
expressions, a power allocation game for companies has been
formulated and solved. Furthermore, a distributed algorithm
has been proposed to compute all equilibrium strategies using
only local information. Moreover, the asymptotic behaviors
as the number of periods increases. In the large population
regime, an appropriate company-to-user ratio has been derived
to maximize the revenue of each individual utility company.
The paper has shown that the multi-period scheme provides
more incentives for the participation of energy consumers in
demand response management, which is of critical importance
[51], and we have also conducted case studies using real data.
For future work, it would be interesting to include energy
scheduling and storage and study their influence on optimal
demands and prices, in addition to including company-specific
operational constraints. The game studied in this paper is
multi-period but essentially static. Therefore, using tools from
dynamic game theory [40] is another possible direction.
X. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that
Bn ≥ E
min
n + ζnKT∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
1
KTpk(t)
− ζn
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)
is the same as∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Bn + ζn
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T pk(t)
KTpk(t)
−
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
ζn ≥ Eminn .
By (10), this is equivalent to
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T d
∗
n,k(t) ≥ Eminn .
Proof of Lemma 1. The matrix A can be represented as
A =

KT (G1(1) + Z) 0 . . . 0
0 KT (G1(2) + Z) . . . 0
...
. . .
0 . . . 0 KT (GK(T ) + Z)

+

−Z
−Z
...
−Z
 (1 . . . 1) := Aˆ+ uvT
Note that Aˆ is invertible. Furthermore,
1 + vT Aˆ−1u = 1− 1
KT
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Z
Gk(t) + Z
.
Since Gk(t) > 0 and Z > 0, each element in the summation
is less than 1 and overall value of the summation is less than
KT , and this clearly leads to 1+ vT Aˆ−1u 6= 0. By Sherman-
Morrison Formula [52], if 1 + vT Aˆ−1u 6= 0, then
A−1 = (Aˆ+ uvT )−1 = Aˆ−1 − Aˆ
−1uvT Aˆ−1
1 + vT Aˆ−1u
. (26)
Thus, A is invertible and we can apply (26).
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, the prices are uniquely
given by P = A−1Y , and by using (26), the price selection
for each k at t is
p∗k(t) =
B
Gk(t) + Z
(
1
KT −∑j∈K∑t∈T ZGj(t)+Z
)
.
Strict positivity follows from
B
Gk(t) + Z
> 0 and
∑
j∈K
∑
t∈T
Z
Gj(t) + Z
< KT.
Proof of Theorem 2.
(i) By plugging-in the demands given by (10) in the revenue
function (7) for k, we have
Uk = B/K + (Z/K)
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)− Z
∑
t∈T
pk(t),
which is concave (linear) in each pk(t). Thus, by the com-
pactness of Lk,t, there exists a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium
(NE) [40]. Next, suppose that a company k deviates from (13)
and announces a price of pˆk(t) = p∗k(t) +  at a fixed time t.
If  > 0, then
Uˆk − Uk = Z − ZK
K
≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from ZK ≥ K. Thus, k has
no incentive to increase the prices from (13). Furthermore,
since the prices given by (13) are attained the equality of
the capacity constraint in (8), company k has no incentive
to choose  < 0 because it will not result in selling more
energy. Therefore, for every period t, company k does not
benefit from deviating from (13). Hence, the prices given by
(13) maximize the revenues and constitute a NE.
(ii) By the uniqueness of the demands given by (10) and
using (i), it follows that there exists a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium and it is given by the pair d∗(p) and (13).
Proof of Theorem 3. Note that (16) is equivalent to
Uk =
∑
t∈T
BGk(t)
(Gk(t) +N)(α−k −
∑
t∈T
N
Gk(t)+N
)
, (27)
where α−k := KT −
∑
j∈K,j 6=k
∑
t∈T
N
Gj(t)+N
. Note that
α−k > KT−(K−1)T = T and it depends on the strategies of
other companies and it is fixed for company k. A pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists if Uk is concave in each Gk(t) ∈ Pk,t
for each company k and if Pk,t is a compact subset of R [40].
Since it is clear that Pk,t is compact, it is enough to show
concavity of Uk. From (27), via a sequence of simple tricks,
Uk = B
∑
t∈T Gk(t)
∏
i 6=t(Gk(i) +N)
Gk(t)+N
Gk(t)+N∏
t∈T (Gk(t) +N)(α−k −
∑
t∈T
N
Gk(t)+N
)
= B
∏
t∈T (Gk(t) +N)
∑
t∈T
Gk(t)
Gk(t)+N∏
t∈T (Gk(t) +N)(α−k −
∑
t∈T
N
Gk(t)+N
)
= B
∑
t∈T
Gk(t)
Gk(t)+N
α−k −
∑
t∈T
Gk(t)+N
Gk(t)+N
+
∑
t∈T
Gk(t)
Gk(t)+N
= B
∑
t∈T
Gk(t)
Gk(t)+N
(α−k − T ) +
∑
t∈T
Gk(t)
Gk(t)+N
=:
f
γ−k + f
Note that fGk(t) =
∂f
∂Gk(t)
= N(Gk(t)+N)2 > 0 and
∂Uk
∂Gk(t)
=
fGk(t)γ−k
(γ−k + f)2
=
Nγ−k
(γ−k + f)2(Gk(t) +N)2
> 0.
This leads to
∂2Uk
∂Gk(t)2
=
[−2Nγ−k][(γ−k + f) + fGk(t)(Gk(t) +N)]
[(γ−k + f)(Gk(t) +N)]2
< 0.
Since f, fGk(t), N, γ−k > 0, it follows that strict concavity
holds and hence existence of a unique pure-strategy NE is
guaranteed. It readily follows from Jensen’s inequality [53]
that the global maximizer for company k’s problem is uniquely
attained at G∗k(t) = G
total
k /T , ∀ t ∈ T . Hence, the NE is
uniquely given by
G∗k(t) = G
total
k /T , ∀ t ∈ T , k ∈ K.
Proof of Theorem 4. To find an appropriate (i)k,t that leads
to the convergence, recall that the prices must be positive. The
algorithm diverges whenever one of the p(i)k (t)’s is negative,
which might happen when
∑
n∈N d
(i)
n,k(t) < Gk(t), for any
company k ∈ K at any time t ∈ T in iteration i. To avoid this,
it suffices to require p(i)k (t)
(i)
k,t >
∣∣∣∑n∈N d(i)n,k(t)−Gk(t)∣∣∣
whenever we have
∑
n∈N d
(i)
n,k(t) < Gk(t). This translates
into requiring p(i)k (t)
(i)
k,t > Gk(t) −
∑
n∈N d
(i)
n,k(t) for any
k ∈ K, t ∈ T , and i. By (10), it follows that we need

(i)
k,t >
Gk(t)−
∑
n∈N
(
Bn+
∑
e∈K
∑
h∈T p
(i)
e (h)
KTp
(i)
k (t)
− 1
)
p
(i)
k (t)
. (28)
The bound (28) is the tightest bound but using it to find (i)k,t
is not implementable. By choosing

(i)
k,t ≥
Gk(t) +N
p
(i)
k (t)
, (29)
convergence is guaranteed since Bn+
∑
e∈K
∑
h∈T p
(i)
e (h)
KTp
(i)
k (t)
≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 5. Suppose that KN <
Bn
pmaxTG∗k(t)
. By
(24), this implies that
pmax <
NBn
KTG∗k(t)
= p∗k(t), ∀ t ∈ T , ∀ k ∈ K,
and companies’ best response is to charge pmax, which implies∑
k∈K
Ugen,k = p
maxKTG∗k(t) < NBn =
∑
n∈N
Bn,
which means that the sum of the revenues is strictly less than
the sum of the budgets and hence companies incur losses. On
the other hand, KN ≥ BnpmaxTG∗k(t) is equivalent to
pmax ≥ NBn
KTG∗k(t)
= p∗k(t), ∀ t ∈ T , ∀ k ∈ K.
Furthermore, we have∑
k∈K
Ugen,k = p
∗
k(t)KTG
∗
k(t) = NBn =
∑
n∈N
Bn.
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